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Abstract
What explains the range of situations in which individuals cooper-
ate? This paper studies a theoretical model where individuals respond
to incentives but are also inﬂuenced by norms of good conduct inher-
ited from earlier generations. Parents rationally choose what norms to
transmit to their oﬀspring, and this choice is inﬂuenced by features of
the external environment, such as the quality of external enforcement,
or the pattern of likely future economic transactions. The equilib-
rium displays strategic complementarities between norms and current
behavior, which reinforce the eﬀects of changes in the external en-
vironment. Norms evolve gradually over time, and if the quality of
external enforcement is chosen endogenously under majority rule, the
equilibrium displays histeresis: adverse initial conditions may lead to
a unique equilibrium path where external enforcement remains weak
and inidividual norms discourage cooperation. Evidence from GSS
surveys in the US is consistent with some of the model predictions.
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11 Introduction
What determines the range of situations in which individuals choose to co-
operate with others? This question has been addressed by a large literature
in economics, political science and sociology. The traditional approach by
economists poses this question in terms of reputation: the scope of coopera-
tion is explained by the strenght of the incentives to preserve one’s reputation
in repeated interactions, relative to the temptation to cheat.1
While the traditional economic approach has yielded important insights,
it misses an important dimension. In many social situations individuals be-
have contrary to their immediate material self interest, not because of an
intertemporal calculus of beneﬁts and costs, but because they have internal-
ized a norm of good conduct. Whether we risk our lives ﬁghting in war, or
bear the cost of voting in large elections, or refreain from stealing or cheat-
ing in an economic transaction, is also determined by our values and beliefs
about what is right or wrong.2 This observation raises several natural ques-
tions: what is the origin of speciﬁc norms of good conduct? What determines
the range of situations over which they are meant to apply? Why do speciﬁc
norms persist in some environments and not in others? How do values and
norms evolve over time? And how do they interact with economic incentives,
and with the economic and political environment?
Until recently and with few exceptions, economists have generally re-
frained from asking these questions and have accepted a division of labor.
Other social sciences, primarily sociology, discuss the endogenous evolution
of values and preferences. Economics studies the eﬀects of incentives on
individual decisions and aggregate outcomes, taking individual preferences
as given. Even when social norms have been acknowledged as playing a
crucial role, as in the selection of focal points when there are multiple equi-
libria, economists have studied the implications of these norms, but not their
endogenous evolution. A byproduct of this division of labor is that, until
recently, the analysis of social norms has generally escaped the discipline of
methodological individualism, the paradigm of economics.3
1Dixit (2004) provides an excellent overview and makes several original contributions
taking the economic approach. Axelrod (1984) and Gambetta (1988) are inﬂuential con-
tributions in political science and sociology, that overlap with the economic approach.
2See for instance the evidence in Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter (2002), or in Fisman
and Miguel (2006).
3Besides the pathbreaking work of Gary Becker (see Becker 1993, 1996), recent con-
2This paper studies the scope of cooperation combining ideas from eco-
nomics and sociology. Throughout I neglect the role of reputation, and view
cooperation as resulting from a tradeoﬀ between material incentives and in-
dividual values. From sociology I borrow the question and the emphasis on
norms of good conduct. Namely, I ask how individual values that sustain
cooperation evolve endogenously over time. But I address this question with
the traditional tool kit of economists, individual optimization and equilib-
rium analysis, and I focus on how norms interact with economic incentives.
The model is adapted from Dixit (2004). Individuals are randomly matched
with others located along a circle, to play a prisoner’s dilemma game. They
play only once, so there is no role for reputation and cooperation can only
be sustained by individual values (a dislike for cheating). The scope of co-
operation corresponds to the set of matches over which cooperation can be
sustained, and this depends both on economic incentives and individual val-
ues.
The model is designed to capture an important idea stressed by sociol-
ogists, that rests on the distinction between limited vs generalized morality
(eg. Banﬁeld 1958, Platteau 2000). Norms of limited morality are applicable
only to a narrow circle of friends or relatives; outside of this narrow circle,
cheating is allowed and regularly occurs. Norms of generalized morality in-
stead are meant to apply generally towards everyone. Individuals who have
internalized norms of generalized morality are likely to cooperate over a larger
range of situations.
To analyze how norms of generalized morality evolve endogenously over
time, I build on the work of Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bisin, Topa and Verdier
tributions by economists have started undermining this division of labor. Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2006) and Fernadez (2007) review much of this recent (mainly empirical)
literature. See also Algan and Cahuc (2006), (2007) and Giuliano (2007). Important theo-
retical contributions on this line of research include Bisin and Verdier (2001), Akerlof and
Kranton (2000), (2006), Benabou and Tirole (2006). Bisin and Verdier (2005) provide a
review. Hauk and Saez Marti (2002), Francois and Zabojnik (2005) and Francois (2006)
have applied the methodology pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001) to closely related
issues. Other recent contributions by economists, with a similar approach but a diﬀer-
ent focus, include Benabou and Tirole (2006), Lyndbeck and Nyberg (2006), Doepke and
Zilibotti (2005). The literature by sociologists on these issues is just too large to be men-
tioned here. But see Nisbet and Cohen (1996) for an interesting example of an attempt
to explain the endogenous evolution of individual values. Bowles and Gintis (2000) have
also formally studied the evolution of norms facilitating cooperation, but without relying
on individual optimization.
3(2004). Parents optimally choose what values to pass on to their children,
but evaluate their chidren’s welfare with their own values. This assumption
of "imperfect empathy" implies that the equilibrium is both forward and
backward looking. It is forward looking, since parents adapt their educa-
tional choices to the future environment of their children. This creates a
strategic complementarity between norms and behavior. If more individuals
follow a norm of generalized morality, then those who abide by this norm are
induced to expand the scope of cooperation (i.e they cooperate over a larger
range of matches). And conversely, an expansion in the scope of coopera-
tion facilitates the diﬀusion of norms of generalized morality. Thus, norms
and behavior mutually reinforce each other, and this strenghtens the eﬀects
of changes in the external environment. But, the equilibrium is also back-
ward looking, because the parents’ values also inﬂuence their educational
choices. Thus, norms evolve gradually over time and during the adjustment
to the steady state the equilibrium reﬂects historical features of the external
environment.
Consider for instance an improvement in the external enforcement of co-
operation that is expected to last for ever. This immediately expands the
scope of cooperation, as players adapt their behavior to the new environment,
for given norms. But the scope of cooperation expands further in subsequent
periods, as parents gradually adapt the norms they transmit to their children
to the better environment. In the long run, an improvement in external en-
forcement changes both individual behavior and norms of good conduct. The
two changes are self reinforcing and enhance the beneﬁcial eﬀects of better
external enforcement. During the adjustment process, the scope of coopera-
tion reﬂects both current and historical features of the external environment.
The endogeneity of norms has additional implications if, as in Benabou
and Tirole (2006), the external environment is also endogenous and reﬂects
political or economic decisions. Better external enforcement of cooperation
beneﬁts individuals who abide by norms of generalized morality, and is likely
to hurt those who cheat. This gives rise to an additional strategic comple-
mentarity. On the one hand, better external enforcement breeds norms that
foster cooperation. On the other hand, if a large majority values cooperating
with others and dislikes cheating, the political equilibrium supports formal
institutions that strongly enforce cooperation. Hence, policies (or formal
institutions) and norms of good conduct are mutually self reinforcing.
In the dynamic equilibrium of the model, this strategic complementar-
ity implies histeresis or multiple equilibria, and initial conditions acquire a
4special importance. If a norm of generalized morality is initially widespread,
then the equilibrium converges to a steady state where a majority retains
these positive norms and supports institutions that enforce cooperation. As
a result, and for both reasons, the scope of cooperation is large. If instead
limited morality initially dominates, then the economy ends up in another
steady state, with opposite features: lax external enforcement, poor norms
and lack of cooperation. In both cases the equilibrium is unique, although
its features are determined by initial conditions. For intermediate values of
initial conditions, the model has multiple equilibria and the economy might
converge to one or the other steady state, depending on the players expecta-
tions.4
These results can explain the puzzling persistence of institutions discussed
in the recent literature on economic development (eg. Acemoglu et al. 2001,
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Tabellini 2005, Rajan and Zingales 2006, Ra-
jan 2006, Glaeser et al. 2005). In particular, they can explain why current
institutional and organizational failures are often observed in countries and
regions that centuries ago were ruled by despotic governments, or where
powerful élites exploited uneducated peasants or slaves. In such countries or
regions, not only current institutions function poorly and economic outcomes
are disappointing, but also individuals typically mistrust others and display
values and beliefs that are consistent with norms of limited morality - see
the evidence in Tabellini (2005).
This lack of social capital in environments with a history of political
abuse and exploitation could be both an independent cause and an eﬀect of
the malfunctioning of current institutions. The results of this paper point
o u tt h a ti np r a c t i c ei ti sb o u n dt ob ev e r yd i ﬃcult to identify which speciﬁc
institutional features are responsible for observed economic outcomes. In
the equilibrium of the model, both formal institutions and norms of good
conduct are jointly determined, and their evolution is dictated by initial and
possibly random historical circumstances.
Nevertheless, micro data strongly support the idea that distant history
has an eﬀect on individual values and beliefs. Exploiting what Fernadez
(2007) has called the "epidemiological approach", I consider the attitudes
towards trusting others displayed by third generations US immigrants, using
4Francois (2006) and Hauk and Saez Marti (2002) also study the two-way interaction
between endogenous norms and features of the external environment (formal institutions),
but they don’t focus on political decisions.
5data from the General Social Surveys. After controlling for observable indi-
vidual attributes, trust is higher amongst the US immigrants whose ancestors
lived in countries that had better political institutions and more educated
population over a century ago, while past economic development of the coun-
try of origin does not seem to matter. Overall, this evidence supports the idea
that the intergenerational transmission of norms is an important determinant
of the scope of cooperation.5
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model in its
simples version with exogenous preferences for cooperation. Section 3 makes
preferences endogenous and shaped by the educational choices of optimizing
parents. Section 4 adds politics and studies the equilibrium with endogenous
preferences and endogenous polcies. Section 5 presents the evidence on the
intergenerational transmission of norms. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Scope of Cooperation with Exogenous
Values
2.1 Preliminaries
The model is adapted from Dixit (2004), chapter 3. A continuum of one-
period lived individuals is distributed along a circle. The density of individ-
uals per unit of arc length is 1, and the size of the circumference is 2S. Thus
the maximum distance between two individuals is S, and S measures the size
of the community.
Each individual is randomly matched with another. As in Dixit (2004),
the matching technology has a local bias: individuals are more likely to be
matched with those located nearby. Speciﬁcally, the probability of a match
with someone located at distance y decreases exponentially with y and is
given by (the denominator is a normalizing factor that insures that the prob-
abilities of all matches between 0 and S sum to 1):
αe−αy
2[1− e−αS]
(1)
5Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) and Algan and Cahuc (2006), (2007) used a
similar approach to study trust in the GSS data, but they did not focus on historical
variables in the ancestors’ country. See also Dohmen et al. (2006) who use data on
German households.
6Thus, the parameter α captures the matching technology, as in Dixit (2004).
As α increases, the probability of more distant matches drops. A higher α
thus corresponds to an environment in which more matches are local.
The two matched individuals observe their respective locations and play a
simple prisoner’s dilemma game. Each player simultaneously chooses whether
to cooperate (play C) or not to cooperate (play NC). The material payoﬀs
from playing the game are illustrated in Table 1:
Table 1. Payoﬀs from Prisoner’s Dilemma
CN C
Cc , c −l,c+ w
NC c+ w,−l 0,0
where c,l,w > 0. It is natural to interpret the parameters w and l as
reﬂecting the quality of external enforcement. A better enforcement of pri-
vate contractual arrangements would reduce the temptation to cheating on
a cooperating partner (w), and it would reduce the loss of being cheated (l).
Besides obtaining the material payoﬀs described above, individuals also
get additional psychological beneﬁts or losses from playing the game. In par-
ticular, each individual incurs a non-economic cost d>max(l,w) whenever it
plays NC irrespective of how its opponent played. These non-economic costs
d e c a yw i t hd i s t a n c ei nt h em a t c ha te x p o n e n t i a lr a t eθ>0. Thus, playing
NC against an opponent located at distance y results in non-economic costs
de −θy. This formulation captures the idea that norms of good conduct apply
with particular force with regard to a circle of close friends or relatives, but
are weaker in encounters with more distant individuals (whatever the space
over which distance is measured). These additional individual consequences
from not cooperating might diﬀer across individuals, and later in the paper
are determined endogenously. This set up and notation are illustrated in
Figure 1.
As will become clear below, when playing the matching game individuals
compare their material payoﬀs with the non-economic cost of not-cooperating.
Here the non-economic costs of cheating decrease exponentially at the rate
θ with the distance in the match, while the economic payoﬀso ft h ep r i s -
oner’s dilemma game do not depend on distance. An alternative fomulation,
suggested by Dixit (2004), would have the material payoﬀsi n c r e a s ee x p o n e n -
tially at rate θ>0 with distance, capturing the idea that matches between
more distant traders are likely to entail bigger gains from trade. This formu-
l a t i o nw a sp u r s u e di nap r e v i o u sv e r s i o na n dt h er e s u l t s( b u tn o tt h ea l g e b r a )
7were identical. More generally, the parameter θ can be interpreted as cap-
turing the rate at which non-economic costs decay, relative to the rate at
which economic payoﬀs increase with distance. The general point that the
model seeks to capture is that interactions between more distant individuals
are likely to entail bigger gains from trade, but also weaker self restraints
against purely selﬁsh motivations. We will refer to this parameter θ as the
rate at which norms of reciprocity decay with distance.
In section ?? below, we discuss an extension that allows for reciprocity
in the non-economic costs of cheating. Namley, the cost de −θy is born only
if the opponent cooperates, but not if both players cheat. All the results dis-
cussed in the paper go through, except that with reciprocity we get additional
strategic complementarities and hence additional equilibria.
2.2 Equilibrium with a single representive individual
In this subsection d and θ are ﬁxed at the same value for everyone. Consider
the perspective of someone who has to decide whether to play NC or C in
a match with a partner at distance y. Throughout, we denote by π(y) the
probability that his partner will play C. We can express his net expected
material gain from playing NC rather than C in a match with y as:
T(π(y)) = [(w − l)π(y)+l] > 0 (2)
We can think of this expression as the temptation not to cooperate. The
right hand side of (2) is strictly positive: it is always better not to cooperate.
Nevertheless, the function T(π(y)) is non-increasing in π(y), the probability
that the opponent will play C, since w ≤ l.
This temptation must be balanced against the non-economic costs of not
cooperating, de−θy. An individual is just indiﬀerent between playing C or
NC in a match with someone at distance ˜ y if:
T(π(˜ y)) = de
−θ˜ y (3)
Solving for ˜ y, we obtain:
˜ y = {ln[d] − ln[(w − l)π(˜ y)+l]}/θ (4)
Note that the cost of not cooperating, de−θy, is strictly decreasing in y.
This follows from the assumption that the norm of good conduct applies
8with greater strenght to closer partners. Hence, holding π constant, this
individual prefers to play C in a match with someone at distance y<˜ y, and
he prefers to play NC if y>˜ y.
To pin down the equilibrium, we have to solve for π(y), the probability
that an opponent located at distance y cooperates. This is done in Appendix
1, which proves that the equilibrium outcome depends on the distance y
between the two partners. Cooperation is sustained if the distance y falls
short of some thresholds, while it fails above those thresholds. Speciﬁcally
deﬁne the distance thresholds Y 0 and Y :
Y
0 = [lnd − lnl]/θ (5)
Y = [lnd − lnw]/θ (6)
and let yMin and yMax be respectively yMin = Min{Y 0,Y} and yMax =
Max{Y 0,Y}. Then Appendix 1 proves the following:
Proposition 1 Let the distance in a match be y. (i) If y<y Min then both
partners play C and the equilibrium is unique. (ii) If y>y Max, then both
partners play NC and the equilibrium is unique. (iii) If y ∈ [yMin,y Max] and
yMin 6= yMax, then there are multiple equilibria. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
w<l ,so that yMax = Y> Y 0 = yMin. Then for y ∈ [yMin,y Max] there are
two equilibria in pure strategies, one in which both partners play C, and the
other in which both partners play NC. Suppose instead that w>l ,so that
yMax = Y 0 >Y = yMin. Then for y ∈ [yMin,y Max] there are two equilibria in
pure strategies, one in which one partner plays C and the other plays NC,
and the other equilibrium in which the roles are reversed.
Throughout the rest of the paper, I restrict attention to the case w ≤ l,
so that the equilibrium is symmetric, and I only consider the more eﬃcient
equilibria, to give the best possible chances to cooperation. Hence, if everyone
has the same cost parameters d and θ, then the best equilibrium entails
r e c i p r o c a lc o o p e r a t i o ni nam a t c ho fd i s t a n c ey ≤ Y, and non-coperation if
the distance is y>Y .
This equilibrium provides a simple theory of the scope of cooperation,
and the variable Y deﬁned by (6) summarizes all the relevant information. In
particular, individuals cooperate over a larger range of matches (the distance
Y increases):
• if the beneﬁto fc h e a t i n g(w) falls;
9• if the non-economic cost of cheating (d) rises.
• if norms of good conduct decay more slowly with distance (if θ falls);
These results are similar to those obtained by Dixit (2004) in his model
based on reputation, despite the diﬀerent reason why here individuals refrain
from cheating. In contrast to Dixit (2004), however, here the range of co-
operation does not depend on the likelihood of matches with more distant
partners, α, nor on the overall size of the economy, S. Note also that, in the
Pareto superior equilibrium, the range of cooperation does not depend on
the cost of being cheated, l.
2.3 Equilibrium with two types of agents.
In this subsection I continue to assume that the cost of not cooperating is an
exogenous parameter, but now I allow for two possible types indexed by k =
0,1. Both types bear the same cost d of cheating. They diﬀe ri nt h er a t ea t
which this cost decays with distance, say θ
1 and θ
0, with θ
0 >θ
1+ln( l
w) ≥ θ
1.
For shortness, I refer to those with k =1as trustworthy or "good", since in
the Pareto superior equilibrium they cooperate in a larger range of matches,
while those with k =0are called not-trustworthy or "bad". Individuals in a
match observe distance, y, but not the trustworthiness of their partner. The
fraction of good (θ
1) types in the population is a known parameter n, with
1 >n>0.6
Repeating the analysis of the previous subsection, it is easy to see that,
for both types, there is a distance threshold ˜ yk,k=0 ,1, that leaves that
type indiﬀerent between playing C and NC,given the probability π(˜ yk) that
his partner will cooperate. Such threshold ˜ yk is still deﬁned by (4), with
θ
k on the right hand side, for k =0 ,1. As stated above, we consider only
the Pareto superior equilibrium that sustains the maximum possible degree
of cooperation (here too there are multiple equilibria similar to those of the
previous subsection).
To characterize such an equilibrium, we need to pin down the equilibrium
probability of cooperation π(y) for all possible values of y. Repeating the
6The assumption that θ
0 >θ
1+log( l
w), rather than just θ
0 >θ
1, simpliﬁes the analysis
because it reduces the possible types of equilibria that may exist, but all the results go
through (with some additional complications) under the weaker condition that θ
0 >θ
1. A
previous version solved for the case in which diﬀerent types have the same value of θ, but
diﬀerent non-economic costs of cheating, say d1 >d 0.
10steps in the previous subsection, it is useful to deﬁne the following thresholds
that induce cooperation by the two types:
Y
0 = [lnd − lnw]/θ
0 (7)
Y
1 = [lnd − ln[(w − l)n + l]]/θ
1 (8)
By construction, in a match of distance y ≤ Y 0, all types with θ = θ
0 ﬁnd
it optimal to cooperate if they expect their partner always to cooperate; if
t h ed i s t a n c ee x c e e d sY 0, they prefer not to cooperate, irrespective of what
their partner does. The term Y 1 corresponds to the distance threshold that
sustains cooperation of the good types, given that their expectations are
consistent with equilibrium.
Since n ≥ 0, our maintained assumption that θ
0 >θ
1 +l n (l
w) implies
that Y 1 >Y0. Hence, the good types cooperate over a strictly larger range
of matches. Those with θ = θ
0 continue to behave as described above: they
cooperate if y ≤ Y 0, and they don’t cooperate if y>Y 0. This behavior
is optimal by deﬁnition of Y 0, and given their expectations that everyone
cooperates if y ≤ Y 0 (see the proof of Proposition 1 for more details). Those
with θ = θ
1 ﬁnd it optimal to cooperate up to distance y ≤ Y 1, given that
they expect cooperation if their partner is good, and no cooperation if he
is bad (and given that the type cannot be observed).7 We summarize this
discussion in the following:
Proposition 2 In the Pareto superior equilibrium of the matching game,
individuals of type k, cooperate in a match of distance y ≤ Y k and do not
cooperate if y>Yk, for k =0 ,1 and with Y 1 >Y0.
The properties of this equilibrium are the same as those of the equilibrium
described in the previous subsection, with a single type, except that now we
get two additional implications. The maximum range over which at least
some individuals cooperate (the threshold Y 1) increases:
• if the loss from cooperating against a cheating opponent (l) falls;
7If θ
1 >θ
0 but θ
0 <θ
1+log( l
w), then the good and bad types would behave identically
if n>0 but small. For n suﬃciently large, we would obtain again that Y 1 >Y 0 and
diﬀerent types behave diﬀerently. Intuitively, the probability of encountering a good type
must be suﬃciently high to make a diﬀerence, or else the diﬀerence in preferences between
t h et w ot y p e sm u s tb es u ﬃciently large.
11• i ft h ef r a c t i o no fg o o dt y p e s( n) increases.
The ﬁrst implication follows from imperfect information: as individuals
cannot observe their opponent type, in equilibrium the good players bear the
risk of cooperating against a cheating opponent. Clearly, the smaller is the
resulting loss, the larger is the range of matches over which cooperation can
be sustained. The second implication reﬂects a strategic complementarity:
given l>w , individuals are more willing to cooperate the higher is the
probability that their partner will also cooperate.
In the introductory section we stressed the distinction between limited vs
generalized morality, namely between norms of good conduct that apply in a
narrow or in a large set of social interactions. The equilibrium summarized in
Proposition 2 provides an analytical foundation to this distinction. Matches
within the distance Y 0 can be interpreted as interactions within a small group
of friends or relatives. Everyone can be trusted to cooperate and behave
well within this narrow group. Matches of distance higher than Y 0 can be
interpreted as interactions in the market or in a larger and more anoymous
set of individuals. Not everyone can be trusted to behave well in these
less frequent interactions, because the temptation to capture the material
beneﬁts of cheating might exceed the psychological discomfort of violating
an internalized norm of good conduct, at least for some individuals in the
population. The scope of maximal sustainable cooperation over these more
distant matches is summarized by the variable Y 1. This variable reﬂects the
features of the external environment that determine individual incentives to
cooperate outside of the narrow circle corresponding to the distance Y0.
Finally, note that, in this model with exogenous preferences, as the ex-
ternal environment changes, individuals react immediately by altering their
equilibrium behavior. The scope of cooperation is enhanced by better ex-
ternal enforcement (lower w or lower l). But there is no dynamics and what
matters is current enforcement, not institutions in the distant past. Hence,
this version of the model is unable to explain institutional persistence.
3E n d o g e n o u s V a l u e s
3.1 The model
This section models the endogenous evolution of the norms that sustain co-
operation, as captured by the parameter θ
k. Our goal is to study how par-
12ents rationally choose what values to transmit to their children, and how
this choice is aﬀected by economic incentives and by features of the external
environment. For simplicity θ
k can only take two values, θ
1 and θ
0 with
θ
0 >θ
1 +l n (l
w) ≥ θ
1 as in the previous section. But we assume that the
actual value taken by θ
k for each individual reﬂects two forces: the exogenous
inﬂuence of nature or of the external environment, and the deliberate and
rational eﬀorts of parents, through education or time spent with their chil-
dren. The crucial assumption is that parents are altruistic and care about
the utility of their oﬀspring, but evaluate their kid’s expected welfare with
their own preferences. This assumption of "imperfect empathy" (cf., Bisin
and Verdier 2001) implies that in some circumstances parents devote eﬀort
to try and shape the values of their children to resemble their own.
Speciﬁcally, consider an ongoing economy that lasts for ever. Individuals
live two periods. In the ﬁrst period of their life they are educated by their
parents and, once education is completed, they are active players in the
game described above. In the second period, each individual is the parent of
a single kid and his only activity is to devote eﬀort to educate him. Parental
education increases the probability that the kid becomes good (i.e. that
θ
k = θ
1), but it is costly for the parent. To obtain a closed form solution
we assume a quadratic cost function: − 1
2ϕf 2, where f ≥ 0 denotes parental
eﬀort to educate his kid, and ϕ>0 is a parameter that captures the marginal
cost of eﬀort (higher ϕ corresponds to a lower marginal cost). Parental eﬀort
is chosen by each parent before observing his kid’s value. Conditional upon
parental eﬀort, the probability of having a good kid does not depend on the
the value parameter of the parent. Speciﬁcally, if a parent exerts no eﬀort
to educate his kid, then with probability 1 >δ>0 the kid is born good
(θ
k = θ
1), and with probability 1−δ the kid is born bad (θ
k = θ
0). If instead
t h ep a r e n te x e r t se ﬀort f to educate his kid, then the probability of having
a good kid is δ + f, and the probability of a bad kid is 1 − δ − f. 8
8Note the asymmetry. We let parents exert eﬀort to increase the expected trustwor-
thiness of their kid, but we assume that they cannot exert eﬀort to reduce it. With a
slight change in notation, this asymmetry can be interpreted almost literally as saying
that inculcating trustworthiness in one’s kid is costly, while inculcating dishonesty or non-
trustworthyness does not cost any eﬀort to the parent. A previous version of this paper
removed the asymmetry, and assumed that it was equally costly for a parent to increase
or decrease the trustworthyness of one’s kid, relative to the choice made by nature. The
qualitiative results were similar, although the derivation was more complicated and addi-
tional conditions on parameter values had to be imposed to obtain some of the comparative
13Once parents have completed the education, each young player observes
his own type and plays the matching game described in the previous section.
Thus, the economy in any given period t behaves exactly like in the matching
game of the previous section with two exogenous types of agents, except that
here we have to keep track of time, because the composition of types is
endogenous and varies with time. As already noted, the matching game
has multiple equilibria if w 6= l. Throughout, I maintain the assumption
that l>wand I restrict attention to the Pareto superior equilibrium of
the matching game described in the previous section. Let nt denote the
proportion of good (θ
1) individuals in the population at the end of period t
(i.e., after parents have exerted eﬀort into educating their kids during period
t). Then, by Proposition 2, players of type k cooperate in a match of distance
y ≤ Y k
t , and do not cooperate if y>Yk
t , where the distance threshold that
triggers cooperation, Y k
t , is still given by (7) and (8), except that it is indexed
by t since Y k
t might depend on time through nt.
Consider a parent of type p w h og i v e sb i r t ht oak i do ft y p ek in period
t, for k,p =0 ,1. Let V
pk
t denote the parent’s evaluation of his kid’s expected
utility in the Pareto superior equilibrium of the matching game described in
subsection 2.3. By the assumption of imperfect empathy, we can write V
pk
t
as:
V
pk
t = U
k
t −
αd
2[1− e−αS]
S Z
Y k
t
e
−(α+θp)zdz (9)
where Uk
t denotes the expected equilibrium material payoﬀso fak i do ft y p e
k, while the second term on the RHS of (9) is the parent’s evaluation of his
kid’s expected non-economic cost of not cooperating in matches of distance
greater than Y k
t . Note that this evaluation is done with the parent’s value
parameter, θ
p, rather than with the kid’s value. Thus, if the kid is born
with the same value of his parent (if θ
p = θ
k), then parent and kid evaluate
the outcome of the kid’s matching game identically. But if the kid and the
parent have diﬀerent values, then V
pk
t diﬀe r sf r o mt h ek i d ’ so w ne v a l u a t i o n :
the value parameter in the last term on the right hand side of (9), θ
p, is that
of the parent, while the relevant distance thresholds according to which the
statics results mentioned below. Unlike in Bisin and Verdier (2001), and given the diﬀerent
focus of our analysis, we neglect the possibility that the kids’values or the eﬀect of parental
eﬀort also depend on the current distribution of types in the population. This implies that
to obtain dynamic stability we need to impose additional conditions on parameter values.
14game is played, Y k
t , a r et h o s eo ft h ek i d .
Exploiting Proposition 2 in the previous section, the kid’s expected ma-
terial payoﬀs in the matching game are:
U
k =
α
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣
Y k
t Z
0
e
−αz[cπt(z) − l(1 − πt(z))]dz +
S Z
Y k
t
e
−αz(c + w)πt(z)dz
⎤
⎥
⎦
(10)
where πt(z) denotes the probability that a partner at distance z will cooper-
ate in period t in the Pareto superior equilibrium - πt(z) is indexed by time
b e c a u s ei tm i g h td e p e n do nnt.T h eﬁrst term on the right hand side is the
expected utility when cooperating, given that the partner cooperates with
probability πt(z). The second term on the right hand side is the expected
utility of not cooperating, again given the probability that the partner co-
operates (recall by Table 1 that if both partners do not cooperate then their
payoﬀs are normalized to 0). Subsection 2 of the Appendix writes down the
expressions for Uk
t in the Pareto superior equilibrium considered in Proposi-
tion 2, replacing πt(z) with the corresponding equilibrium expressions.
The following Lemma, proved in subsection 3 of the appendix, veriﬁes
t h a tap a r e n ta l w a y sp r e f e r st oh a v eak i dw i t hh i so w nv a l u e s ,a n dt h i si sa
strict preference if diﬀerent values induce diﬀerent behavior (i.e. if Y 1 >Y0):
Lemma 3 If k 6= p, then V
pp
t ≥ V
pk
t , with strict inequality if Y 1 >Y0.
This intuitive result reﬂects two assumptions. First, individual types are
not observable, and hence there is no incentive for strategic delegation (i.e
there is no strategic gain in distorting the kid’s preferences when he plays the
subsequent game).9 Second, imperfect empathy implies that the only reason
for changing one’s kid value θ
k is to induce him to change his behavior: the
disutility from non-cooperation is evaluated by the parent with his own value,
9The assumption that a kid’s value is not observable is not necessarily always appro-
priate. Levy and Razin (2006), for instance, formulate a theory of religion based on the
assumption that one’s religion is obervable (maybe only within a subset of the population).
This creates a strategic incentive to join a religious organization, to signal one’s type. But
in Levy and Razin (2006), individual values are stable and exogenous, and individuals
choose their own religion (i.e. there is no role for parents to shape their kid’s values or
beliefs).
15θ
p, and hence the parent does not directly beneﬁtf r o mal o w e rc o s to fn o n -
cooperative behavior by his kid, except through the induced eﬀects on the
kid’s behavior.
Given that eﬀort to educate one’s kid costs the parent some disutility ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h eq u a d r a t i cf u n c t i o ns u m marized above, and given that parental
eﬀort is chosen before observing the kid’s type, Lemma 3 immediately im-
plies:
Corollary 4 A "good" parent (p =1 )exerts strictly positive eﬀort. A "bad"
parent (p =0 )exerts no eﬀort.
Intuitively, by Lemma 3, a bad parent would like to have a bad kid. Hence,
he will never exert any eﬀo r tt oi n c r e a s eh i sk i d ’ se x p e c t e dt r u s t w o r t h i n e s s .
C o n v e r s e l y ,ag o o dp a r e n tw o u l dl i k et oh a v eag o o dk i d .H e n c ea tt h em a r i n g
he is prepared to exert at least some eﬀort to increase the probability of this
happening.
Given this result, the proportion of good individuals playing the match-
ing game in period t, nt, evolves endogenously over time according to the
following law of motion:
nt = nt−1(δ + ft)+( 1− nt−1)δ = δ + nt−1ft (11)
where from here onwards, with a slight abuse of notation, ft denotes eﬀort
by the good type parents only. Intuitively, if parents exerted no eﬀort, then
the average fraction of good kids in the population would just equal δ. But
the good parents (of which there is a fraction nt−1 in period t) exert eﬀort ft
in period t, and this increase the fraction of good kids in the population on
averge by nt−1ft.
3.2 The parent’s optimization problem
This subsection describes how the good parents choose eﬀort, ft. Each parent
takes as given the eﬀort choices of all the other parents, and takes into account
the equilibrium implications of his kid’s value for his own welfare, according
to (10) and (9). At an interior optimum, the ﬁrst order condition for an
optimum equates the marginal cost and the expected net marginal beneﬁto f
eﬀort, and by (10) and (9) it can be written as:
ft/ϕ =( U
1
t − U
0
t )+
αd
2[1− e−αS]
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−(α+θ1)zdz (12)
16Consider the right hand side of (12), that captures the net marginal beneﬁt
of eﬀort. The ﬁrst term is the change in the kid’s expected material payoﬀs,
if his value switches from θ
0 to θ
1. This term is always negative, since for
any probability that the partner in a match will cooperate, the kid’s expected
material payoﬀs are always higher if the kid plays NC (see (33) in subsection
2 of the appendix for a proof). The second term is the expected beneﬁto f
extending the scope of the kid’s cooperative behavior to a larger range of
matches, evaluated with the parent’s values, θ
p = θ
1 (note that Y 0 is time
invariant by (5)). This term is always positive, since extending the scope of
the kid’s cooperative behavior decreases the direct non-economic cost born
by the parent. Hence, the parent perceives a tradeoﬀ.I n c r e a s i n g h i s k i d ’ s
trustworthiness hurts the kid’s expected material payoﬀs, and this cost is
internalized by the parent. But a good kid also provides expected direct
non-economic beneﬁts to the parent. By Corollary 4, we know that the
beneﬁts exceed the costs, and hence ft > 0.
Exploiting the equilibrium expression for U1
t −U0
t as given by (33) in sub-
section 3 of the Appendix, we can rewrite the parents’ optimality conditions,
(12) as:
ft =
ϕαd
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣−e
−θ1Y 1
t
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz +
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−(α+θ1)zdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ ≡ F(Y
1
t ) > 0 (13)
Note that ft denotes a probability. Thus, implicit in (12) is a restriction on
parameter values (and in particular on ϕ) guaranteeing that 1 ≥ ft. As we
shall see below, dynamic stability of the equilibrium requires 1 >f t, which
we assume throughout. Equation (13) deﬁnes ft as a known function of Y 1
t ,
ft = F(Y 1
t ) - note that all other terms on the right hand side of (13) are
ﬁxed parameters, including Y 0. Subsection 4 of the appendix proves:
Lemma 5 The function F(Y 1
t ) is strictly increasing in Y 1
t .
Intuitively, if the diﬀerence in behavior between good and bad types in-
creases (as captured by the variable Y 1
t ), then good parents are induced to
put more eﬀort to increase the probability of having a good kid. That is,
parental eﬀort increases as the behavioral implications of their kids values
become more relevant.
This property is important, because it gives rise to a second strategic
complementarity. If parents expect others to put more eﬀort into education,
17they anticipate that the fraction of good types will increase. They realize
that this will expand the scope of cooperation, Y 1
t , and as a result they exert
more eﬀort. In fact, it is easy to verify that the educational game described
in this section is supermodular (cf. Amir 2003).
3.3 The equilibrium
Replacing ft with F(Y 1
t ) in (11) and simplifying, the equilibrium is thus given
by the vector (Y 1∗
t ,n ∗
t) that solves the following two equations:
Y
1
t =[ l n d − ln[(w − l)nt + l]]/θ
1 ≡ Y (nt) (14)
nt = δ + nt−1F(Y
1
t ) ≡ N(Y
1
t ,n t−1) (15)
The ﬁrst equation deﬁnes the maximum distance Y 1
t that sustains coop-
eration by the good types, as a function of the proportion of other good types
in the population, Y 1
t = Y (nt). Since we assumed strategic complementarity
in the matching game (l>w ), cooperation is easier to sustain if there are
many good types around. Hence, Y 1
t is an increasing (and convex) function
of nt, as depicted by the curve Y 1
t = Y (nt) in Figure 2.
T h es e c o n de q u a t i o nd e ﬁnes the law of motion of the proportion of good
types, as a function nt = N(Y 1
t ,n t−1).A s Y 1
t increases, good parents are
induced to put more eﬀort into changing their kid’s value (by Lemma 5,
the function F(Y 1
t ) is strictly increasing in Y 1
t ). Hence, the function nt =
N(Y 1
t ,n t−1) is also increasing in Y 1
t .
Together, equations (14) and (15) implicitly deﬁne the equilibrium vector
(Y 1∗
t ,n ∗
t) as a function of nt−1 :
Y
1∗
t = G
Y(nt−1) (16)
n
∗
t = G
n(nt−1) (17)
Setting nt = nt−1 = ns, we obtain the steady state equilibrium:
Y
1∗
s = Y (n
∗
s) (18)
n
∗
s =
δ
1 − ft
(19)
where fs = ft(Y 1∗
s ) is the steady state value of educational eﬀort by the good
parents.
18As both curves in Figure 2 are increasing, multiple equilibria are possible.
That is, the same fraction of "good" parents nt−1 might imply more than
one equilibrium pair for parental eﬀort and scope of cooperation, (Y 1∗
t ,n ∗
t).
The reason for the possible multiplicity is the already mentioned strategic
complementarity between norms and behavior.
The equilibrium is unique if the curve nt = N(Y 1
t ,n t−1) always intersects
the curve Y 1
t = Y (nt) from left to right, as drawn in Figure 2. Subsection 4
of the appendix proves that a suﬃcient condition for this to happen is:
1
l − w
>ϕ
h
(
w
d
)
λ0
− (
w
d
)
λ1i
(A1)
Note that this condition is certainly satisﬁed if ϕ or (l − w) are suﬃciently
small - that is if the marginal cost of eﬀo r tf o rt h ep a r e n t si ss u ﬃciently high,
or if the strategic complementarity in the prisoner’s dilemma game is suﬄi-
cently small. Condition (A1) thus guarantees that the equilibrium (Y 1∗
t ,n ∗
t)
is unique. In the remainder of the paper we assume that this condition
holds.10
Subsection 5 of the appendix proves that, under condition (A1), the func-
tions GY(nt−1) and Gn(nt−1) are strictly increasing in nt−1. Subsection 6 of
the appendix also proves that there is a ¯ ϕ>0 such that, if ¯ ϕ>ϕ>0, then
dGn(nt−1)/dnt−1 < 1. We summarize the implications of this discussion in
the following:
Proposition 6 If condition (A1) holds, then the equilibrium (Y 1∗
t ,n ∗
t) is
unique. For ϕ>0 but small enough, the equilibrium asymptotically reaches
t h es t e a d ys t a t e(Y 1∗
s ,n ∗
s) deﬁned by (18)-(19). If (A1) holds, then the path
towards the steady state is monotonic and during the adjustment to the steady
state (Y 1∗
t ,n ∗
t) move in the same direction.
3.4 Discussion
As already noted, the variable Y 1
t can be interpreted as the scope of coopera-
tion induced by a norm of generalized morality. As the external environment
changes, individuals immediately adjust their behavior responding to incen-
tives, and Y 1
t reacts accordingly. But this is not the end of the story. The
10O fc o u r s e ,t h em a t c h i n gg a m ed e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n2a n dp l a y e di ne a c hp e r i o db yt h e
kids has multiple equilibria. But here we are restricting attention to the Pareto superior
equilibrium of the matching game.
19diﬀusion of a norm of good conduct, as captured by the fraction of good
individuals, nt, is also part of the equilibrium. The variable nt evolves slowly
over time, as it reﬂects both the current features of the environment, as well
as the culture of previous generations.
Cultural forces and economic incentives interact through strategic com-
plementarities and have self-reinforcing eﬀects on individual behavior. On
the one hand, having more good individuals around expands the scope of
cooperation, because it reduces the risk of exploitation by a more shrewd
partner (Y 1
t is an increasing function of nt). On the other hand, as the scope
of cooperation increases, parents put more eﬀort into education, because they
realize that the cultural trait that they value in their children will have more
pronounced behavioral implications (ft and hence nt are increasing in Y 1
t ).
We now discuss how the equilibrium is aﬀected by changes in the under-
lying parameters. Throughout we assume that condition (A1) holds and that
ϕ is suﬃcienty small that equilibrium is dynamically stable. We also assume
that the economy is originally in the steady state, (n∗
s,Y1∗
s ).
Better external enforcement Suppose that at the beginning of period
t =0 , before parents choose their educational eﬀort, the payoﬀs to the match-
ing game change. Speciﬁcally, consider a reduction in the loss l, the cost of
cooperating against a deviating partner. This change can be interpreted as
an improvement in the external enforcement of cooperation.11 As l is reduced,
the curve Y 1
t = Y (nt) i nF i g u r e2s h i f t st ot h er i g h t-c f( 1 4 ) . I n t u i t i v e l y ,
for a given nt, the good types now cooperate over a larger range of matches.
Moroever, the threshold Y 0 is not aﬀected by this change. As a result, the
curve nt = N(Y 1
t ,n t−1) remains unaﬀected in period 0, since its position does
not directly depend on the parameter l if Y 0 remains unchanged - cf. (13).
Thus, the scope of cooperation expands.
This improvement in the external environment in turn induces parents
to increase their educational eﬀort - the curve N(Y 1
t ,n t−1) is increasing in
Y 1
t , as drawn in Figure 2. Hence, this initial change results in a larger frac-
tion of good types (n0 rises), which further increases the scope cooperation
11A change in the temptation to cheat, w has ambiguous eﬀects on the equilibrium,
since it aﬀects both Y 0 and Y 1
t . The next section discusses the consequences of external
enforcement more at length, also considering the eﬀect of changing w over some distance
ranges. A larger gain from cooperation, c, holding the parameters w and l ﬁxed, has no
eﬀects on the equilibrium, since it does not aﬀect any of the margins that are relevant for
the kids or the parents decisions.
20sustainable in period 0.
But this is not the end of the process, because in period 1 the curve
N(Y 1
t ,n t−1) shifts upwards. S i n c em o r ep a r e n t sa r eg o o d( n0 has risen), more
of them put eﬀort into educating their children. Hence in period 1 the propor-
tion of good kids is even higher than in period 0 (n1 >n 0) and this brings
about an even larger range of cooperative matches in period 1, Y 1
1 >Y 1
0 .
The adjustment continues smoothly over time, and for ϕ small enough a new
steady state is reached. This new steady state has both a larger fraction
of good types and cooperation is sustained over a longer range of matches.
Thus, a permanent change in the external environment continues to have
eﬀects for many generations after it has occurred, through the educational
choices of rational parents.
Al a r g e re c o n o m y Next, consider the eﬀect of an increase in the size
of the circle, S. As emphasized by Dixit (2004), this corresponds to the
economy growing in size, for instance because technological improvements
have increased the scope of mutually beneﬁcial economic exchange. As the
population remains ﬁxed in size, the circle becomes uniformly less dense, and
the probability of a match within any distance y<Sis reduced. This means
that the probability of a match in the interval [Y 0,Y1
t ] also shrinks. As a
result, ft goes down as parents reduce their educational eﬀort - cf. the right
hand side of (13). Intuitively, parental education only matters for matches
in the interval [Y 0,Y1
t ], because outside of this interval the kid beahves in
the same way irrespective of the education received. This shifts down the
N(.) curve, while the Y (.) curve on impact remains unaﬀected. In the new
steady state both ns and Y 1
s shrink: an expansion in the size of the economy
reduces the fraction of trustworthy types and shrinks the range of cooperative
matches. To put it more bluntly, globalization (the equivalent of an increase
in S) reduces the scope of cooperation because it destroys the values that
induce individuals to cooperate. This is the same qualitative eﬀect found in
Dixit (2004), although here the forces at work are very diﬀerent.
A more localised economy Suppose that α increases. This corresponds
to increasing the rate at which the probability of a match decays with dis-
tance. In other words, the economy becomes more localised, in the sense that
distant matches are less likely. This has no eﬀect on the curve Y 1
t = Y (nt),
but it shifts the curve N(Y 1
t ,n t−1), and hence changes educational eﬀort,
21s i n c ep a r e n t sr e a l i z et h a tt h i e rk i di sm o r el i k e l yt oi n t e r a c tw i t hc l o s e rp a r t -
ners. How exactly eﬀort changes with α depends on the scope of the norms of
limited and generalized morality. Speciﬁcally, Subsection 7 of the appendix
proves that equilibrium eﬀort, f∗
t , increase with α if Y 1
t < ¯ Y,and decreases
with α if Y0 > ¯ Y,where:
¯ Y =
1 − e−αS(1 + αS)
α(1 − e−αS)
(20)
Note that ¯ Y< S(see subsection 7 of the Appendix). Thus, quite intuitively,
if the scope of norms of generalized morality is small relative to the size of the
economy, (Y 1
t is low), then a more localised economy means that matches in
the region [Y0,Y1
t ] become more likely, and this induces parents to increase
eﬀort. Conversely, if the scope of limited morality is large relative to the size
of the economy (Y 0 i sh i g h ) ,t h e nk i d sa r em o r el i k e l yt oi n t e r a c ti nd i s t a n c e
ranges below Y 0, and in this case a more localised economy reduces parental
eﬀort. For intermediate values the eﬀect of a more localized economy can go
either way depending on interactions with other parameters of the model. In
other words, a more localised economy discourages cooperation if the scope
of limited morality is not too narrow, and has the opposite (i.e. positive)
eﬀect if the scope of generalized morality is not too wide, relative to the size
of the economy. The dynamic adjustment is then as discussed above.
More generally, the eﬀects of changing α and S illustrate a general and
intuitive property of the model. Eﬀort to inculcate trustworthiness in one’s
kid depends on the likely patterns of interaction in the economy. Whatever
increases the likelihood of interactions in the region above Y 0 and below
Y 1
t , where the distinction between limited and generalized morality matters,
also increases the parents incentive to educate their kids. Very local interac-
tions (below Y 0) or very distant interactions (above Y 1
t ) have the opposite
eﬀect, because the distinction between limited and generalized morality has
no behavioral implication in those regions.
3.5 Extensions: Reciprocity
The model assumes that the non-economic cost d is born irrespective of
whether the partner cooperates or not. An alternative and perhaps more
plausible formulation has the player bearing the cost d only if he cheats
against a cooperating partner in a match. This alternative formulation can
easily be incorporated in the model, and it would result in two main changes.
22First, the Pareto superior equilibrium of the matching game would entail
an additional strategic complementarity. Speciﬁcally, while the deﬁnition of
Y 0 is not aﬀected, the upper threshold of cooperation, Y 1
t , now becomes:
Y
1
t = [lnd +l nnt − ln[(w − l)nt + l]]/θ
1 ≡ Y (nt) (21)
Comparing (21) with the previous expression in (14), we have added the term
lnnt that was missing in (14). Intuitively, if more good types are around, then
the expected cost of cheating rises (since it is more likely to occur againts a
cooperating opponent). Hence, a rise in the fraction of good types (a higher
nt) induces a further expansion in the scope of cooperation corresponding to
the norm of generalized morality. Note that this strategic complementarity
arises even if l = w, in which case the matching game without the norm of
reciprocity has a unique equilibrium (cf. Proposition 1).12
Second, parents too bear the non-economic cost d only if their kid cheats
against a cooperating opponent. This means that the optimality condition
for eﬀort also changes, and the variable nt pre-multiplies the second term
on the right hand side of both (12) and (13). This has two eﬀects. First, it
dampens parental eﬀort (because having a bad kid is now less costly). Sec-
ond, it introduces a further strategic complementarity also in the educational
decision of parents. If parents expect others to increase eﬀort, they realize
that their kid is more likely to be matched with a good partner (since nt is
higher). This raises the cost of having a bad kid (since his cheating is more
likely to be against a cooperating opponent). Hence, they are induced to
exert more eﬀort.
Besides these two eﬀects, the remaining analysis is unaﬀected (of course,
some of the speciﬁc conditions discussed above to characterize the equilibrium
would also change). But these additional strategic complementarities imply
that multiple equilibria are more likely to exist. More generally, reciprocity
increases the strategic complementarities between behavior (as captured by
the the scope of cooperation, Y 1
t ), and norms of generalized morality (as
captured by the fraction of good types, nt). For this reason, a norm of reci-
procity also reinforces the eﬀects of changes in the external environment on
equilibrium outcomes.
12This norm of reciprocity would also add a continuum of other equilibria to those in
Proposition 1. In particualr, there would always exist an equilibrium where everyone
cheats in any match (or in a subset of matches) just because it expects everyone else to
do the same (and hence to bear no cost from cheating). As stated in the text, here we
conﬁne attention to the Pareto superior equilibrium.
234 Endogenous Government Policies
If the payoﬀs of the matching game result from policy choices, diﬀerent player
types might disagree on government policies. When public policies are cho-
sen under majority rule, this creates an additional strategic complementarity.
In particular, good types generally prefer better enforcement of cooperation,
compared to the bad types. Hence, if the good types are a majority, the gov-
ernment enacts better external enforcement. But the anticipation of better
enforcement induces parents to exert more eﬀort into teaching generalized
morality to their children. As a result, the fraction of good types in the pop-
ulation increases and might become a majority, just because it is expected
to be a majority. Conversely, if parents expect the government to refrain
from enforcing cooperation, their incentive to spread generalized morality is
diminished, and this expectation might become a political reality.
A similar point is illustrated in an interesting recent paper by Benabou
and Tirole (2006) with respect to social insurance policies, in a model where
parents conceal information to their kids to overcome a time-inconsistency
problem. In this section we illustrate that the same forces are at work in
the enforcement of cooperation, even without time inconsistent preferences.
Since we have an explicitly dynamic economy, here the interaction between
endogenous policies and endogenous preferences has additional implications.
Not only we get multiple equilibria, we also obtain histeresis: initial con-
ditions matter, because they might lead the economy to a diﬀerent steady
state. Thus, the interaction of culture and government policies is a source
of persistence, which could explain why some economies that started oﬀ in
political or economic backwardness might remain trapped for ever with poor
institutions and adverse cultural traits.
4.1 Two enforcement regimes
To simplify the algebra, throughout this section we assume that l = w,s o
that the matching game does not exhibit strategic complementarity and has
a unique equilibrium. We also retain the model as laid out above, without
the extension to reciprocity. As discussed in section 2, this implies that the
maximum distance that sustains cooperation does not depend on nt even for
the good types, and is given by:
Y
k = [lnd − lnw]/θ
k,k =0 ,1 (22)
24In terms of Figure 2, the Y (nt) curve is vertical. Under this assumption, any
strategic complementarity can only arise from the endogeneity of government
policy, since for a given policy the equilibrium is unique.
The parameter w (or l) can be interpreted as reﬂecting external enforce-
ment by the government. A lower value of w corresponds to a smaller tempta-
tion not to cooperate and a smaller loss from cooperating against a cheating
opponent, and hence better external enforcement. For simplicity, we restrict
attention to a binary policy choice, high and low enforcement. We model bet-
ter external enforcement as a reduced temptation to cheat in matches outside
o ft h es a f er a n g ey ≤ Y 0. Speciﬁcally, in the regime of low enforcement, the
temptation not to cooperate retains the same value w for all matches. In the
regime of high enforcement, instead, the temptation not to cooperate drops
to w0 = w/η < w for matches of distance y ≥ ˆ Y,with Y 1 > ˆ Y> Y 0. We
assume
ˆ Y> [ln(d) − ln(w)+l n ( η)]/θ
0 (23)
which implies that the bad players (with k =0 )continue to ﬁnd it optimal
to cooperate only up to the distance Y0, even in the high enforement regime.
The high enforcement regime, instead, induces the good players to cooperate
over a larger range of matches, Y 01 >Y1, where Y 01 is still deﬁned by (22)
with w0 replacing w.
Consider the expected utility of a player who knows his own type and
who is about to play the matching game. It is easy to verify that the good
types are always better oﬀ in the high enforcement regime, since they bear
a smaller loss from being cheated (see subsection 8 of the Appendix). This
in turn induces the parents to exert more eﬀort to educate their kid in the
high than in the low enforcement regime. Let f 0 and f denote educational
eﬀort in the high and low enforcement regimes respectively, with f = F(Y 1)
as given by (13) above with w = l in it. Note that parental eﬀort no longer
depends on time, in either regime, since with w = l eﬀort no longer depends
on nt. Subsection 7 of the appendix proves:
Lemma 7 f 0 = f + ∆, with ∆ > 0
The bad types, instead, might be better oﬀ in either regime, depending on
parameter values. We assume that they are better oﬀ in the low enforcement
regime and subsection 8 of the appendix provides a suﬃcient condition for
this to happend.
25The timing of events in each period t is as follows. First, parents choose
their educational eﬀort. Then, the kids’ types become known and the kids
vote over the enforcement regime. Finally, the kids play the matching game.
Note that, under this timing, the kids only consider their utility in the cur-
r e n tp e r i o d . W h e nt h ev o t ei st a k e n ,t h ef r a c t i o no fg o o dt y p e si sa l r e a d y
determined. Thus, current enforcement only aﬀects current payoﬀs, and it
has no eﬀect on future equilibrium outcomes.
4.2 Political-economic equilibrium
Under these assumptions, the political equilibrium is straightfoward. If
nt > 1/2, then the high enforcement regime prevails; if nt < 1/2, then the low
enforcement regime prevails; and for nt =1 /2 a coin is tossed. The expecta-
tion of diﬀerent enforcement regimes, in turn, induces diﬀerent educational
eﬀorts by the parents. If parents expect nt > 1/2, then they anticipate better
enforcement and, by Lemma 6, they exert more eﬀort to inculcate trustwor-
thiness in their kid. And viceversa, if they expect nt < 1/2, they reduce
eﬀort.
This set up induces a strategic complementarity in the education decision
of the parents, and for some parameter values it can give rise to multiple
steady states. Speciﬁcally, suppose that parents expect the low enforcement
regime to prevail. Then the steady state fraction of good types is given
by (19) in the previous section, reproduced here for convenience (with fs
replaced by f):
n
∗
s =
δ
1 − f
(24)
If n∗
s < 1/2, this steady state reproduces itself in a political equilibrium.
Suppose instead that parents expect the high enforcement regime. Then, by
Lemma 6, the steady state fraction of good types is:
n
0∗
s =
δ
1 − f − ∆
(25)
If n0∗
s > 1/2, this steady state too reproduces itself in a political equilibrium.
Thus, both steady states are possible in equilibrium if n0∗
s > 1/2 >n ∗
s, or, by
(25) and (24), if:
∆ > 1 − 2δ − f>0 (A3)
which of course requires δ<1/2.
26As already noted, if w = l, then the curve Y (nt) is vertical (i.e., the
thresholds of maximal cooperation, Y 1 and Y 01, do not depend on nt). Thus,
both steady states are always dynamically stable as long as 1 >f+∆, which
is implied by (A3). Since f>0, the adjustments to both steady states are
also monotonic. Which steady state is reached in equilibrium depends on the
i n i t i a lc o n d i t i o n sa sw e l la so nt h ep a r e n t s ’e x p e c t a t i o n s ,a sw en o wd i s c u s s .
The high enforcement regime is an equilibrium in period t if, given that
it is expected, we have nt > 1/2. By (11), this condition can be stated as:
nt = δ + nt−1(f + ∆) > 1/2 (26)
Similarly, the low enforcement regime is an equilibrium in period t if, given
that it is expected, nt < 1/2, namely if :
nt = δ + nt−1f<1/2 (27)
Combining (26) and (27), we obtain two thresholds, that deﬁne which equi-
libria exist in period t, depending on the fraction of good types in period
t − 1. Speciﬁcally, let:
n
¯
=
1 − 2δ
2(f + ∆)
(28)
¯ n =
1 − 2δ
2f
(29)
with ¯ n>n
¯
. Then we have:
Lemma 8 If nt−1 < n
¯
,t h e ni np e r i o dt the unique equilibrium has low en-
forcement. If nt−1 > ¯ n then in period t the unique equilibrium has high
enforcement. If ¯ n ≥ nt−1 ≥ n
¯
, then both the low and the high enforcement
regimes exist as equilibria in period t.
The proof is straightforward. If nt−1 is so low that it falls below the
threshold n
¯
, then even if parents expect high enforcement, we have nt < 1/2.
Hence high enforcement cannot be a political equilibrium. Conversely, if
nt−1 is so high that it exceeds the threshold ¯ n, then even if parents expect
low enforcement we have nt > 1/2, which rules out low enforcement as an
equilibrium. For values of nt−1 in between the two tresholds, either regime
could win a majority depending on the parents’ expectations.
27Suppose that condition (A3) is satisﬁe d ,s ot h a tw eh a v et w os t e a d y
states. Suppose further that both steady states fall outside of the interval
[n
¯
, ¯ n]. Manipulating (28)-(29) and (24)-(25), a suﬃcient condition for this to
happend is:
1 − f
2δ
− 1 > ∆ > 1 −
f
1 − 2δ
(A4)
w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e sδ ≤ 1/4 (and which also implies (A3)). Since the
adjustment towards the steady state is monotonic, then the thresholds n
¯
and
¯ n deﬁne three regions with diﬀerent dynamics. If the economy starts from
an initial condition n0 < n
¯
, then the equilibrium is unique. The economy
remains for ever in the low enforcement equilibrium and it converges to the
low enforcement steady state. Conversely, if the economy starts from an
initial condition n0 > ¯ n, then the equilibrium is again unique. The economy
remains for ever in the high enforcement equilibrium and it converges to the
high enforcement steady state. If the initial condition is in between these
two tresholds, n0 ∈ [n
¯
, ¯ n], then both paths are feasible equilibria, and the
economy eventually ends up in one or the other steady state depending on
expectations.
If condition (A4) is violated, then one of the steady states (or both)
are inside the region where multiple equilibria are possible. In this case
eventually the economy might end up in the region of multiple equilibria,
and one or the other steady state will be reached depending on expectations
(if both inequalities in (A4) are violated then both steady states are inside
the region of multiple equilibria and the economy certainly reaches this region
in ﬁnite time for any initial conditions).
We summarize the foregoing discussion in the following.
Proposition 9 If condition (A3) holds, then the economy has two steady
states, one with high external enforcement and where the good players are a
majority; and one with low external enforcement and where the good players
are a minority. Both steady states are dynamically stable. If condition (A4)
also holds, and if the initial fraction of good players,n 0, is outside of the
interval [n
¯
, ¯ n], then the equilibrium is unique. For n0 < n
¯
(for n0 > ¯ n),
the economy remains always under the low (high) enforcement regime and
eventually reaches the low (high) enforcement steady state. If condition (A4)
is violated, then multiple equilibria are possible during the adjustment path
towards one or the other steady states.
284.3 Discussion
This Proposition can explain why distant historical circumstances have such
long lasting eﬀects, and why some countries or societies may remain trapped
in cultural, institutional and economic backwardness. Despotic leaders that
abuse of their citizens or don’t enforce the rule of law are likely to dissem-
inate adverse cultural traits in the community. Such traits then inﬂuence
the political choices of citizens once the autocrat is replaced by democratic
institutions. Even if the country becomes a democracy, it retains weak insti-
tutions because adverse cultural traits induce a preference for policies that
stiﬂe cooperation. Better institutions are available, and nothing prevents the
country from adopting them, but this does not happend in a political equi-
librium. The majority prefers to retain worse institutions because it beneﬁts
from them, since it can take advantage of those few cooperating citizens who
strongly dislike cheating. Whether cheating corresponds to tax evasion, or
to free riding on public transportations, or on the public welfare system, the
institutions that allow weak law enforcement are chosen and preferred by a
majority of citizens themselves. This cultural explanation of institutional
persistence is quite diﬀerent from others suggested in the literature, that em-
phasize the power of the élites against the will of the citizens at large (eg.
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
Note that the presence of at least some citizens who strongly value co-
operation and who are occasionally exploited by other more shrewed players
is not necessary for this result. Even if almost everyone ends up with a low
value for cooperation, better external enforcement would still be opposed if it
costs resources. The reason is that the beneﬁts of better enforcement would
be negligible in a society where trust and cooperation are so low that many
mutually advantageous trade opportunities are foregone anyway.
The importance of initial conditions also implies that temporary shocks
might have permanent eﬀects, if they move the economy from one equilib-
rium trajectory to another. Suppose for instance that the economy is on the
path that leads to the better steady state, with nt above the region of mul-
tiple equilibria. But suppose that, because of a war, or of an inept political
leader, external enforcement temporarily deteriorates. If the deterioration of
t h ee x t e r n a le n v i r o n m e n tl a s t sl o n ge n o u g ht oh a v ea ni m p a c to ni n d i v i d u a l
cultural traits, the fraction of good types might move outside the region of
multiple equilibria, and the economy and the institutions never recover, even
when the external circumstances are changed.
29Finally, this example has assumed that individuals vote or act politically
according to their self interest. Here cultural traits inﬂuence political pref-
erences only because they have implications for how individuals are aﬀected
by the quality of external enforcement. If instead individual values also have
a direct impact on political acts, as seems plausible, then this would open up
an additional channel through which the external environment interacts with
individual values, and this could reinforce the results presented above.13 We
have also assumed that the parents generation does not vote and does not
particpate in the matching game. Relaxing these assumptions would increase
the sources of persistence described in this and in the previous sections.
5S o m e e v i d e n c e
As already anticipated, the theoretical results of the previous sections are
consistent with the evidence in Tabellini (2005), that a history of political
backwardness is associated with current lack of social capital and institutional
malfunctioning across and within countries. This section presents additional
and more direct evidence that distant history shapes individual values and
beliefs, as they are passed from one generation to the next.
One of the central results of the model is that the values of currently
alive individuals reﬂect the external environment in which earlier generations
were living. The so called "epidemiological" approach used in several recent
papers is one way to test this result (Fernandez 2007 reviews the relevant
empirical literature, and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006 and Algan and
Cahuc 2006, 2007 have applied the same approach to closely related issues).
This exploits data on the opinions of immigrants, to test whether they reﬂect
features of the country of origin of their ancestors.
To measure the attitude of individuals towards cooperation, I use the mea-
sure of trust that many other empirical papers have studied before, namely
the answer to the question of how much the respondent thinks he can trust
others. This is not really a measure of trustworthiness, but of trusting oth-
ers. Nevertheless, it is strongly correlated with more precise indicators of
trustworthiness in opinion polls where both measures are available, and it
13Alesina and Angeletos (2006) consider a model where individuals vote according to
their self interest and also according to a notion of what is fair and unfair. In their model,
however, individual values are exogenously given and do not interact with the economic
environment.
30has the advantage that it is widely available in many surveys.
I use the US General Social Surevey (GSS), that contains data on trust,
as well as other relevant information on the respondent. My sample consists
of about 4300 third generation immigrants to the US, namely individuals
born in the US who have at least two grand-parents born outside of the US.
To classify where these immigrants come from, I rely on a question that asks
what is the ancestors’ country of origin.14 I mainly focus on countries that
originated at least 25 individuals in the sample, but the results are robust
to including a larger or smaller set of countries of origin. Table 2 lists the
relevant coutries and how many respondents in the sample originated from
each country. With the exception of Russia and Mexico, the set of countries
is fairly homogenous in terms of current level of development, though not in
terms of political and economic history in the distant past.
Do the current attitudes of these third generation immigrants reﬂect his-
torical or current features of their ancestors’ country of origin? To answer this
question, I estimate a probit model, where the dependent variable is trust,
deﬁned as one if the respondent thinks that most people can be trusted, and
zero otherwise (don’t know or no answers are omitted). Throughout I control
for several features of the respondent, such as his gender, income, education,
employment status, age, religion, whether he is married or has children, the
education of his parents, whether he lives in a large metropolitan area, the
number of grand parents born abroad, and a set of dummy variables for his
area of residence and for the decade in which the survey was carried out (the
surveys span the period 1977-2004, since before this period the question on
the birthplace of the respondent was not included in the questionnaire) - see
the notes to Table 3 for a complete list. Several but not all of these variables
are statistically signiﬁcant, and in particular income, gender, employment
status, age and the mother’s education. Controlling for this long list of indi-
vidual attributes should make it likely that, if we ﬁnd an eﬀect on individual
trust of variables measuring features of the country of origin of ancestors, it
reﬂects transmitted cultural traits, rather than economic variables such as
income or human capital.
For this type of probit regression, Table 3 shows the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of variables that measure alternative features of the ancestors’ country
14Unfortunately the GSS survey does not ask about the country of origin of grandpar-
ents, but of the more vaguely deﬁned ancestors. Since this is probably interpreted by the
respondent as reﬂecting the ancestors who had more inﬂuence on his family history, it
need not introduce much measurement error.
31of origin (in other words, the variables reported in Table 3 only vary across
diﬀerent countries of origin of the ancestors). Standard errors are clustered
by ancestors’country, to allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation of the
residuals by ancestors’ country. Column 1 of Table 3 reproduces a ﬁnding
already discussed in recent papers by Guiso, Zinagales and Sapienza (2006)
and by Algan and Cahuc (2006), (2007) on a slightly diﬀe r e n ts a m p l eo fG S S
respondents. Namely, trust attitudes of US immigrants are strongly corre-
lated with average trust in the ancestors’ country, as measured by the latest
World Value Surveys conducted around the year 2000 (the variable Trust
from 2000 WWS). This is already important evidence of the transmission of
cultural traits across generations. Third generation US immigrants have had
time to adapt to their new environment, that certainly diﬀers from that of
their ancestors.
Columns 2 and 3 replace contemporaneous trust in the ancestor’s coun-
try with a measure of historical political institutions in the country origin.
The variables Constr. Exec up to 1900 and P o l i t y 2u pt o1 9 0 0are the
ﬁrst principal component of the variables Constraints on the Executive and
Polity2 in the Polity IV data set, measured in the years 1850, 1875 and 1900.
Higher values correspond to stronger constraints on the executive or more
democratic political institutions. Both variables are highly statistically sig-
niﬁcant and show that trust is higher in third generation US immigrants that
come from countries that over a century ago had better political institutions.
Similar results are obtained if political institutions are sampled in diﬀerent
years or are aggregate in diﬀerent ways.
C o u l dt h i sr e s u l tb ed u et ot h ef a c tt h a ti m m i g r a n t sf r o mc o u n t r i e sw i t h
better political institutions were richer, and this in turn increases the stock
of wealth of currently alive respondents ? Since we are already controlling
for individual income and education, and for parental education, this does
not seem very likely. But to allow for this possibility, columns 4 and 5 add
as a regressor per capita income in the ancestors’ country in 1870 and in
1930 respectively (the source is Maddison 2001).15 Political history remains
signiﬁcant and its coeﬃcient does not vary, while per capita income in the
country of origin has a positive estimated coeﬃcient which however is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 6 adds a historical measure of education in the country of origin,
15Adding this variable implies that we loose immigrants from Russia and the former
socialist countries in Eastern Europe, for which the Maddsion data are not available.
32namely primary school enrollment in 1910 (Primary school enr. 1910), taken
from Benavot and Riddle (1988). Since education is likely to foster trust,
immigrants that were coming from countries with higher school enrolment on
average were likely to be better educated. We expect that this cultural feature
is transmitted to subsequent generations and thus we expect this variable to
have a positive eﬀect on trust of current generations. This is what we ﬁnd:
the estimated coeﬃecient of this variable is statistically signiﬁcant, and the
estimated coeﬃcient on constraints on the executive remains positive and
signiﬁcant.
Finally, the last column of Table 3 reports the full speciﬁcation, with
variables measuring political history, past education, past income and con-
temporaneous trust in the country of origin. All variables except per capita
income are statistically signiﬁcant and with the expected sign. Thus, the his-
torical variables of the ancestors’ country of origin contribute to explain the
attitides of third generation immigrants, but so does current average trust in
the country. A plausible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that national culture
is determined by more than the sparce historical variables included in the re-
gression (hence current average trust retains its staistical signiﬁcance); but at
the same time a country’s history has additional explanatory power besides
current trust, because the latter also reﬂects more recent events that could
not inﬂuence the cultural traits of earlier generations and hence of currently
alive US respondents.
These national variables explain a signﬁcant fraction of the of current
trust of US respondents, averaged by country of origin. Replacing the na-
tional variables reported in Table 3 with dummy variables for the ancestors’
origins, we can estimate the average eﬀects of diﬀerent ancestors origin. If we
regress the estimated coeﬃcients of these dummy variables on the three his-
torical variables reported in column 6 (weighting observations by the number
of third generation US immigrants from each country), we reproduce similar
results to those reported in Table 3, and these three variables explain up
to 63% of the variance in the estimated coeﬃcients. Adding current aver-
age trust from the WWS surveys, as in column 7, the fraction of variance
explained goes up to over 77%. Figure 3, that plots the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of the dummy variables against all the country of origin regressors
included in column 7 illustrates that the estimates are not due to any outlier
observations.
Of course, we have to be aware of the data limitations. First, the number
of ancestors’ country is small (from 21 to 17, depending on the speciﬁca-
33tion). Second, immigrants are certainly not a representative sample of the
underlying population. Third, although we can explain most of the variation
in country averages, the individual responses display a lot of unexplained
variation. Nevertheless, none of these problems suggests that the estimated
coeﬃcients are likely to be biased upwards. On the contrary, to the extent
that many of the national variables meant to capture national cultural traits
are measured with error, their estimated coeﬃcients would be biased towards
zero.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Economic backwardness is typically associated with a large range of institu-
tional, organizational and government failures, simultaneously along many
dimensions. In many stagnating countries or regions, politicians are ineﬀec-
tive and corrupt, public goods are under-provided, law enforcement is inad-
equate, corruption and moral hazard is widespread inside public and private
organizations. There is not just one institutional failure. Typically, the coun-
tries or regions that fail in one dimension also fail in many other aspects of
collective behavior. And conversely, when institutions or organizations func-
tion well, they do so along many dimensions. Moreover, institutional failures
or successes do not just reﬂect the design of public policies; they also result
from the behavior of public oﬃcials, or of private individuals inside private
or public organizations.
Economists, unlike other social scientists, have until recently refrained
from relying on a cultural explanation of these patterns, arguing that culture
is endogenous and hard to pin down. This paper has studied a model in
which cultural traits are transmitted by forward looking and rational par-
ents, who adapt their educational choices to the environment in which their
children will live. If the external environment gurantees better enforcement
of cooperation, both norms and individual behavior adapt with mutually re-
inforcing eﬀects through strategic complementarities. But parents evaluate
their children’s welfare with their own values, and this creates cultural persis-
tence. In equilibrium, the range of situations in which individuals cooperate
also depends on the external environment that prevailed several generations
ago. A history of respect for the rule of law and eﬀective law enforcement
encourages current cooperation because it facilitates the diﬀusion of norms
of generalized (as opposed to limited) morality. If the current law enforce-
34ment regime is also endogenous, the forward looking behavior of parents gives
rise to an additional strategic complementarity between current educational
choices and future political decisions, and the equilibrium displays histere-
sis. Parents refrain from encouraging their children to cooperate with others
if they anticipate that such cultural trait will remain minoritarian. Hence,
cultural persistence induces persistence of formal institutions, and a coun-
try that starts out with ineﬃcient institutions and adverse cultural traits
retains them for ever. The aggregate evidence discussed in the literature,
and the microeconomic evidence presented in this paper, are consistent with
this phenomenon.
Much remains to be done, to pin down more precisely the channels of
cultural transmission both inside and outside of the family, to understand the
role of learning and formal education, and to study empirically the relevance
of speciﬁc cultural traits. But the general issue of how individual norms
of conduct evolve and interact with the economic and political environment
is a very exciting area of research, that can be fruitfully studied with the
standard tools of economic analysis.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider ﬁrst the simplest case in which w = l. In this case the net material
gain of playing NC does not depend on the strategy played by the opponent.
Then the threshold ˜ y that leaves the player indiﬀerent between cooperating
or not simpliﬁes to ˜ y = Y 0 = Y. The proposition then immediately follows
by the deﬁnition of ˜ y and the fact that the cost of cheating, de−θy, is strictly
decreasing in y, while the temptation T(π(y)) equals w for all π(y).H e r e
each player has a simple dominant strategy and the equilibrium is unique.
If w 6= l, then the optimal choice of each player depends on his beliefs
about what his opponent will do, and some matches entail multiple equilibria.
In particular, consider the threshold of indiﬀerence, ˜ y, in (4). Replacing π(y)
with 0 and 1 respectively, equation (4) yields ˜ y = Y 0 and ˜ y = Y, as deﬁned
in (5) and (6). Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition follow again immediately
from the deﬁnition of ˜ y, and the fact that the cost of cheating, de−θy, is
strictly decreasing in y, while the temptation T(π(y)) does not depend on
y, holding π constant. But if y ∈ [yMin,y Max], then multiple equilibria are
35possible, depending on the value of π(y).
Speciﬁcally, consider ﬁrst the case w<l ,so that Y> Y 0. Suppose that
y ∈ [Y 0,Y]. If the opponent is expected to cooperate (π(y)=1 ) , then ˜ y =
Y> y ,so reciprocal cooperation is a best response. While if the opponent
is expected not to cooperate (π(y)=0 ) , then ˜ y = Y 0 <y ,so reciprocal
non-cooperation becomes a best response.
Next, consider the case w>l ,so that Y< Y 0. Suppose that y ∈ [Y,Y 0].
If the opponent is expected to cooperate (π(y)=1 ) , then ˜ y = Y< y , so
non-cooperation is a best response. While if the opponent is expected not
to cooperate (π(y)=0 ) , then ˜ y = Y 0 >y ,so now cooperation becomes a
best response. Hence, here the two matched players ﬁnd it optimal to play
opposite strategies. In this case, there is also a symmetric equilibrium where
both players play the same mixed strategy. QED
7.2 Expected Utility in the Equilibrium of Proposition
2
Here we write down the players’ expected utility in the Pareto superior equi-
librium summarized in Proposition 2, letting nt be indexed by time. For
those with θ = θ
0, (10) simpliﬁes to:
U
0
t =
α
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣c
Y 0 Z
0
e
−αzdz +( c + w)nt
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ (30)
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 3 0 )c o r r e s p o n d st ot h ee x p e c t e dm a -
terial beneﬁt in a match within the safe distance where both partners always
cooperate; the second term is the expected outcome in the intermediate area
where only the good cooperate, while the bad types play non-cooperatively.
The expected utility of those with θ = θ
1 instead is:
U
1
t =
α
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣c
Y 0 Z
0
e
−αzdz +[ cnt − l(1 − nt)]
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ (31)
where the ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 3 1 )c o n t i n u e st oh a v et h e
same interpretation, while the second term is the expected outcome, given
t h a to n l yt h eg o o dt y p e sc o o p e r a t ei nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ed i s t a n c er a n g e .
36Note that, (8) implies:
de
−θ1Y 1
t =[ l +( w − l)nt)] (32)
Hence, (30) and (31) imply:
U
1
t − U
0
t =
−α[l +( w − l)nt)]
2[1− e−αS]
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz =
=
−αde−θ1Y 1
t
2[1− e−αS]
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz < 0 (33)
where the last equality follows from (32).
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Here we omit the time indexes since they are redundant. Consider the so-
lution to the problem of maximizing V pk, as deﬁn e di n( 9 ) ,b yc h o i c eo fθ
k.
As discussed in the text, θ
k enters the expression for V pk only through the
distance threshold Y k that triggers non-cooperation by the kid. Hence, by
(10) and (9), diﬀerentiating V pk with respect to θ
k and rearranging, we have:
∂V pk
∂θ
k =
αe−αY k
2[1− e−αS]
∂Y k
∂θ
k
n
de
−θpY k
− [(w − l)π(Y
k)+l]
o
(34)
By (7) and (8), ∂Y k
∂θk < 0. Hence, the optimal value of dk is such that Y k
solves the expression
de
−θpY k
=[ ( w − l)π(Y
k)+l] (35)
for π(Y k) corresponding to the equilibrium probability of cooperation by a
partner located at distance Y k. But by (4), this implies θ
k = θ
p. Hence the
p a r e n ts t r i c t l yp r e f e r st oh a v eak i dw i t hh i so w nv a l u ep a r a m e t e r .Q E D
7.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Diﬀerentiating the RHS of (13) with respect to Y 1
t and simplifying, we have:
FY 1
t =
ϕαd
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣θ
1e
−θ1Y 1
t
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ > 0 (36)
37QED
7.5 Slope of the functions nt = N(Y 1
t ,n t−1) and Y 1
t =
Y (nt)
Equation (15) implies that NY 1
t = nt−1FY 1
t > 0
Diﬀerentiating the RHS of (14) with respect to nt,w ea l s oh a v e :
Ynt =
1
θ
1
l − w
xt
> 0 (37)
where xt = l+(w−l)nt ≥ 0 (since nt ≤ 1).T h es i g nYnt follows from l>w .
The function N(Y 1
t ) intersects the function Y (nt) from left to right, as
drawn in Figure 2, if NY 1
t < 1/Ynt, or, by (35), (36) and (37), if:
1
l − w
>
ϕαnt−1
2(1 − e−αS)
⎡
⎢
⎣
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ =
ϕnt−1
2(1 − e−αS)
[(
w
d
)
λ0
− (
xt
d
)
λ1
] (38)
where λ
k = α/θ
k and where the last equality follows from (7) and (8). Note
that
nt−1
2(1−e−αS) < 1 and xt ≥ w. Thus, a suﬃcient condition for (38) to hold
is:
1
l − w
>ϕ
h
(
w
d
)
λ0
− (
w
d
)
λ1i
(A1)
which is certainly satisifed if l − w or ϕ are suﬃciently small - recall that
d>wand that λ
1 >λ
0, so that the right hand side of (??) is strictly positive.
7.6 Dynamic stability of the steady state
Applying the implicit function theorem to (16) and (17), we have:
dn∗
t
dnt−1
=
Nnt−1
1 − Ynt.NY 1
t
dY 1∗
t
dnt−1
=
dn∗
t
dnt−1
Ynt
Under (A1), 1 − Ynt.NY 1
t > 0 (see the previous subsection of the appendix).
Moreover:
Nnt−1 = ft > 0
38where the inequality follows from Corollary 4. Hence, (A1) implies
dn∗
t
dnt−1 > 0
and (since Ynt > 0)
dY 1∗
t
dnt−1 > 0.
To prove that
dn∗
t
dnt−1 < 1, we need to prove that Nnt−1 < 1 − Ynt.NY 1
t , or
equivalently, that
ft + Ynt.NY 1
t < 1 (39)
By (36) and (37), the term Ynt.NY 1
t is proportional to ϕ. By (13), the term ft
is also proportional to ϕ. Deﬁne ¯ ϕt as the value of ϕ such that ft+Ynt.NY 1
t =
1. Note that ¯ ϕt depends on t through the terms xt and nt−1 (cf. (37), (36)
and (13)). Deﬁne ¯ ϕ =a r gm i n ( ¯ ϕt), where the minimization is taken over all
feasible values of nt−1 and xt. Since Nnt−1 > 0,Y nt > 0 and NY 1
t > 0,t h e n
¯ ϕ>0. Then, for any 0 <ϕ<¯ ϕ, (39) also holds. QED
7.7 Eﬀect of a more localised economy (higher α)
Taking the derivative of ft in (13) with respect to α and rearranging, we
have:
∂ft
∂α
=
ϕd
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣
Y 1
t Z
Y 0
e
−αz(e
−θ1z − e
−αY 1
t )Ψ(z)dz
⎤
⎥
⎦ (40)
where the function Ψ(z) is:
Ψ(z)=1− e
−αS(1 + αS) − αz(1 − e
−αS) (41)
Let ¯ Y be such that Ψ(¯ Y )=0 . By (41), we obtain that ¯ Y is deﬁned as in
(20). Since Ψz(z) < 0, then Y 1
t < ¯ Y implies Ψ(Y 1
t ) > 0, w h i c hi nt u r n
implies Ψ(z) > 0 for any z ∈ [Y 0,Y1
t ]. By equation (40), then, Y 1
t < ¯ Y
implies
∂ft
∂α > 0. Conversely, Y 0 > ¯ Y implies Ψ(Y 0) < 0, which in turn
implies Ψ(z) < 0 for any z ∈ [Y 0,Y1
t ]. By equation (40), then, Y 0 < ¯ Y
implies
∂ft
∂α < 0.
Finally, consider ¯ Y − S. By (41), we have ¯ Y − S<0 if 1 − e−αS <α S ,
which is true for any αS > 0 (as can be seen by diﬀerentiating both sides
with respect to αS). Hence, ¯ Y< S .
7.8 Proof of Lemma 6
Let a 0 denote the high enforcement regime. In this regime, the diﬀerence in
the expected material payoﬀso fag o o da n dab a dk i dc a nb ew r i t t e na s( c f .
39subsection 2 of the appendix):
U
01
t − U
00
t =
−α
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣w
ˆ Y Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz + w
0
Y 01 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ =
=
−α
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣w
Y 1 Z
Y 0
e
−αzdz + w
0
Y 01 Z
Y 1
e
−αzdz − (w − w
0)
Y 1 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ (42)
Repeating the previous analysis, parental eﬀort is given by the following ﬁrst
order condition, adapted from (12):
f
0/ϕ =( U
01 − U
00)+
αd
2[1− e−αS]
Y 01 Z
Y 0
e
−(α+θ1)zdz (43)
Combining (42) and (43), and exploiting (13) for w = l,w eh a v e :
ft
0 = ft + ∆
where
∆ =
ϕα
2[1− e−αS]
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
(w − w
0)
Y 1 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz − w
0
Y 01 Z
Y 1
e
−αzdz + d
Y 01 Z
Y 1
e
−(α+θ1)zdz
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
(44)
We also have:
∂∆
∂w0 =
ϕα
2[1− e−αS]
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
−
Y 01 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz − w
0e
−αY 01∂Y 01
∂w0 + de
−(α+θ1)Y 01∂Y 01
∂w0
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
=
=
−ϕα
2[1− e−αS]
Y 01 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz < 0
where the second equality follows from d = w0eθ1Y 01. Note that when w0 = w,
we have Y 01 = Y 1 so that ∆ =0 , by (44). Thus, w0 <wimplies ∆ > 0. QED
40For later use, it is convenient to simplify the expression on the right hand
side of (44), to obtain:
∆ =
ϕαd−λ ˆ w1+λ
2[1− e−αS](α + θ
1)
©
θ
1(w
1+λ − w
01+λ)/ˆ w
1+λ − (1 + θ
1)(w − w
0)/ˆ w
ª
(45)
where λ = α/θ
1 and ˆ w = de−θ1 ˆ Y.
7.9 Policy preferences
Here we show that the good players always prefer the high enforcement
regime, and we provide a suﬃcient condition that guarantees that the bad
players prefer the low enforcement regime.
Let V 01
t denote the expected utility of the good types under the high
enforcement regime. Exploiting the envelope theorem and adapting (31) and
(9) to the high enforcement regime, we have:
∂V 01
t
∂w0 = −
α
2[1− e−αS]
(1 − nt)
Y 01 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz < 0
where Y 01 is their maximum threshold for cooperation under this regime.
Since this expression holds for any w0, t h eg o o dt y p e sa r ea l w a y si nf a v o ro f
the high enforcement regime, the more so the smaller is w0 relative to w.
Next, consider the bad types. Since the threshold Y 0 is not aﬀected by the
regime, the diﬀerence in their overall expected utility under the two regimes
is:
U
00
t − U
0
t =
αnt
2[1− e−αS]
⎡
⎢
⎣(c + w
0)
Y 01 Z
Y 1
e
−αzdz +( w
0 − w)
Y 1 Z
ˆ Y
e
−αzdz
⎤
⎥
⎦ (46)
Exploiting the fact that e−αY 1 =( w
d)λ and that e−αY 01 =( w0
d )λ, where
λ = α/θ
1 and ˆ w = de−θ1 ˆ Y, and after some algebra, it is possible to show that
the expression on the right hand side of (46) is strictly positive if:
c
wλ − (w0)λ
w − w0 +
w1+λ − (w0)1+λ
w − w0 > ˆ w
λ (A2)
which is certainly satisﬁed if c is large enough, or if λ ≥ 1 and w−w0 is large
enough.
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Table 2 – Country of origin of Ancestors 
 
Country of origin  N. of observations Frequency (%) 
   
Austria  69 1.60 
Canada  200 4.63 
Denmark  51 1.18 
Finland  46 1.06 
France  63 1.46 
Germany  834 19.31 
Greece  38 0.88 
Hungary  75 1.74 
Ireland  485 11.23 
Italy  668 15.46 
Lithuania  40 0.93 
Mexico  252 5.83 
Netherlands  94 2.18 
Poland  376 8.70 
Portugal  30 0.69 
Russia  162 3.75 
Slovak Republic  149 3.45 
Slovenia  45 1.04 
Spain  40 0.93 
Sweden  153 3.54 
United Kingdom  450 10.42 
   
Total 4320 100 
 Table 3.  Trust and ancestors’ countries 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 
Dependent variable  trust 
           
Trust from 2000 WWS    0.63         0.75 
  (0.21)***        (0.19)***
Constr. Exec.  up to 1900   0.06   0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06 
   (0.02)***  (0.02)**  (0.03)**  (0.02)*** (0.01)***
Polity2 up to 1900    0.05        
    (0.02)***       
Per capita income 1870      0.09      
     (0.09)      
Per capita income 1930       0.08  -0.04  -0.15 
       (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.08)* 
Primary school enr. 1910         0.50  0.50 
         (0.22)**  (0.15)***
           
Observations  4320 4320 4320 3969  3969  3593 3593 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03  0.04 0.04 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country of origin of ancestors               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
All regressions include the following controls: 
Gender; family income in constant dollar (base=1986); dummy variables if completed high school, if completed college, 
if working, if unemployed, for age over 65, for age under 25, if married, for having at least one child, if catholic, 
if protestant, if jewish, if father attended primary school, if mother attended primary school, if father attended 
college, if mother attended college, for living in urban area; number of grandparents born outside US; dummy variables 
for survey’s decade (1980s, 90s or after year 2000); dummy variables for region of residence (New England, Middle 
Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain or 
Pacific). Figure 1
player
match
distance y
prob. of match: ~ e-αyFigure 2
nt
nt
*
Yt
1 Yt
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N(Yt
1, nt-1)Figure 3 – Trust and ancestors’ country of origin